Satire, racist humour, and the power of (un)laughter: On the restrained nature of Swedish online racist discourse targeting EUmigrants begging for money
Introduction
The present article analyses online racist affective-discursive practices, focusing specifically on racist satire appearing in online discussions about EU-migrants begging for money taking place on the Swedish discussion website Flashback (www.flashback.org). Racist satire is placed in the context of discursive interactions in this online arena and compared to other forms of racist humour articulated there. The analytical focus is on the relative subtlety of different forms of online racist humorous discourse, as well as on the order unfolding in online racist humorous interactions.
EU-migrants begging for money are a central concern in contemporary Swedish politics and public debate. Their precarious living conditions have received attention and action has been taken to cater for their rights and needs (see e.g . Pettersson 2014; Nebel 2014) . But there have also been campaigns for criminalizing street begging, campaigns more or less explicitly targeting EU-migrants (e.g. Sverigedemokraterna 2014; Magnusson 2014) . Furthermore, Roma EU-migrants have been the target of Swedish online racist discourse on Flashback for several years, as will be seen in the analyses below. And recently, several tent camps of Roma EUmigrants have been burned down in racist attacks, which were both applauded and, it seems, partly planned in discussion threads on Flashback (e.g. Habul 2014; Ankersen 2014 ). This strongly motivates investigating Swedish online racist discourse targeting EU-migrants, particularly in the Flashback setting.
Furthermore, this article also has a theoretical concern, reflected in the focus on racist satire. In Swedish public discourse (e.g. Bjurwald 2013; Helin 2011) , as well as in some research on online racism reviewed below, it is assumed that online articulations of racism result from the anonymity of online settings, where people presumably lose or give up their attempts to restrain themselves emotionally, not needing to take others' evaluations into account. This suggests that the subtlety and indirection of contemporary racism pointed out in discursive research, also reviewed in the next section, would not be present in online articulations of racism. However, this ignores the possibility that racism may be discursively expressed in different, more or less subtle and restrained ways, including indirect modes such as satire, online as well as offline. Furthermore, while online racist articulations may seem unrestrained from the point of view of mainstream discourse, this does not mean that online interactions articulating racism do not accomplish some order demanding a certain emotional restraint, although a very different one from that demanded by mainstream discourse.
Thus, the present article aims to problematize the assumption about online racist discourse as unrestrained by raising the following questions: (1) How might satire be used as a subtle affective articulation of racism in Flashback discourse about EUmigrants begging for money, and how does satire differ in this respect from other forms of racist humour in this online discursive arena? (2) How might interactions unfolding around satire and other forms of humour accomplish a racist order around humour in
Before critically reviewing research about restraint in online and offline racism, an important point has to be made. Referring to racist satire and other types of racist articulation as 'humour' is not intended to convey an aesthetic judgment from my side. It only refers to discursive practices the participants themselves present as humorous, and to the use of discursive techniques typically involved in humorous communication, in online articulations of racism.
Perspectives on online racist discourse

Research background: online racism, restrained or unrestrained?
Discursively oriented research has stressed the subtle and indirect nature of contemporary racist discourse. For example, denials and disclaimers often precede articulations of racism, and rhetorical strategies are often used to communicate racism without explicitly derogatory words for migrants and minorities (e.g. Bonilla-Silva 2014; Van Dijk 2000; 1992) . This is due to norms against explicitly expressing racism (e.g. Bonilla-Silva 2014; Feagin 2013; Billig 2001 ) and feelings of superiority (Wouters 2007; 1998) in contemporary Western societies, making subtle communication necessary in 'frontstage' settings (Picca and Feagin 2007) .
However, this discursive requirement of 'political correctness' is commonly suggested not to hold online. For instance, comparing online forum discussions with a public meeting, Coffey and Woolworth (2004: 10) argue that 'the anonymity the Internet affords gives prejudiced people license to publicly express racial attitudes', while 'communication in the physical presence of others does tend to bring about restraint'. Similar claims are made in other recent research on online racism (e.g. Steinfeldt, Foltz and Kaladow et al 2010: 368; Melican and Dixon 2008: 152) . Such arguments echo the notion of 'online disinhibition ' (e.g. Lapidot-Lefler and Barak 2012; Suler 2004 ), a version of Zimbardo's (1969) theory of 'deindividuation': under anonymous conditions, people lose, or give up, their sense of self and their adherence to norms and expectations of others, whereby their behaviour becomes intensely emotional, impulsive, irrational -i.e. unrestrained (Zimbardo 1969: 253) .
Other research, however, suggests that online racist discursive practices are not always unrestrained. Daniels (2009a; 2009b) investigates 'cloaked websites', which communicate racist positions in a subtle way that uninformed users might mistake for civil rights discourse. Such 'coded' practices in online racist discourse, resulting from increased monitoring of online user comments, lead Hughey and Daniels (2013: 338) to call for a new 'Racial Internet Literacy' sensitive to the subtle 'slang and language of virtual racial invective and messaging'. The present article aims to contribute to such literacy by focusing on the use of humorous, particularly satirical, racist discursive practices in Flashback discussions about EU-migrants begging for money.
Furthermore, against 'online disinhibition', proponents of the social identity model of deindividuation effects (e.g. Reicher, Spears and Postmes 1995) show that anonymous individuals do not act aggressively towards out-groups due to loss of restraint; rather, individuals are more susceptible to restraint, i.e. conformity to in-group norms of hostility towards out-groups, under anonymous online circumstances where their social identities are salient (e.g. Reicher, Spears and Postmes 1995; see also Douglas and McGarty 2001; 2002; Spears and Lea 1994) . This suggests that online racist articulations are shaped by in-group norms, and not only by general norms of 'political correctness', as suggested by the research on racist discourse reviewed above.
However, as suggested by Wetherell and Potter (1992) , social identity theory typically ignores how such in-group norms, or normative orders, are accomplished in discursive interactions. This may be said about the 'online disinhibition' perspective as well. In contrast, the present article aims to analyse not only the subtle ways in which satirical humorous discourse articulates racist positions, whereby 'political correctness' is circumnavigated, but also how a racist, in-group normative order is accomplished in humorous discursive practices unfolding in discussions about EU-migrants on Flashback.
(Un)restrained emotion, affective-discursive practice, and research on online racist humour Furthermore, social identity theory tends to ignore affect and emotion (Billig 2002) . The same could be said about the discursive research on racism reviewed so far (cf. below).
1
Emotions are part of the original 'disinhibition' paradigm, albeit in a problematic way.
First, in contrast to this paradigm, hatred and violence against out-groups involve the active repression or restraint of some emotions (notably shame, but also empathy; e.g. Scheff 1990; Turner 2007; Vetlesen 2011) while others are actively cultivated. The latter include anger, but also happiness, satisfaction, and pride about inflicting harm upon enemies (Turner 2007; Vetlesen 2011) . This suggests the importance of humour in racist discursive interaction (see below). Second, the 'disinhibition' perspective assumes that emotions are inner, pre-discursive entities restrained by 'rational' judgment in non-anonymous settings, but released in anonymous settings (e.g. Zimbardo 1969: 259) . Thus, emotions involved in aggressive behaviour are seen as 'things' with certain intrinsic properties that make them inherently irrational to express, regardless of discursive context. This assumption takes a particular normative order of emotional restraint for granted, ignoring that classifying some emotional expressions as 'irrational' (or 'aggressive' or 'violent') is a judgment, rather than an objective description (a similar argument is made by Burkitt 2014: 4). Such an assumption is less useful when the problem to be investigated is whether and how online racist humorous articulations might be restrained by and involved in accomplishing order.
In contrast, the present article approaches online racist discourse as an affective-discursive practice (e.g. Wetherell 2014; 2012) . Such a perspective treats emotions as inseparable from the ongoing discursive interactions in which they are made meaningful (Wetherell 2014: 86) . Furthermore, it treats the articulation of emotions as inextricably entangled in the accomplishment of ordered patterns of social relationships (Wetherell 2012: 24) , while at the same time recognizing that such ordered patterns and the affective meaning-making involved in them are contingent (or 'could be otherwise', p. 4). Thus, in the present article, articulations of emotions in online racist discourse are studied as part of interactional processes of accomplishing affectivediscursive order, rather than measured against a taken-for-granted order of emotional restraint. In particular, it focuses on the use of the subtle humorous practice of satire to articulate emotions in online racist discussions under scrutiny and on the order of racist humour emerging in responses to satire.
This brings me to the affective-discursive practice of online racist humour. Billig (2001) argues that the meta-discourse of online racist joke sites disrupts mainstream boundaries of reason, allowing expression of violent racist fantasies otherwise discursively repressed. In a different way, Weaver (2011) analyses how the rhetorical structure of online racist jokes strengthens racist claims to 'truth', thus reducing modern ambivalences around the Other and contributing to racist order building. Unlike Weaver, and following the affective-discursive practice perspective just outlined, I focus on the interactional practice of racist humorous order building as well as its rhetorical structures. Unlike Billig, I focus on the boundaries accomplished, and not only those disrupted, in online racist affective-discursive interactions around satire and other humour forms. Finally, neither Billig nor Weaver specifically addresses the use of satire in online racist discourse (although Weaver discusses it in relation to the Danish Muhammad Cartoons). The next section outlines the components of satirical humour relevant for the analysis of online racist discourse about EU-migrants begging for money in Sweden.
Racist satirical discourse
The structure of satirical discourse. With Frye's often-quoted formulation, satire may be defined as 'militant irony' (Frye 1990 (Frye /1957 , i.e. irony used for the purpose of attack. Irony is an indirect mode of communication (e.g. Berger 1997: 27) . But in what sense is satirical humorous discourse ironic?
According to Simpson (2003) , any satirical discursive act (utterance, text, image) involves two types of irony, played out against each other. First, satire involves echoic irony, i.e. it imitates some other act in an abstract or generalized way that aligns the echoed act with the position of the satirist and creates ironic distance to its original source. Simpson labels this the prime of satirical discourse (p. 95-96). However, secondly, a discursive act is not satirical unless a dialectic form of irony is introduced.
This creates a tension within the satirical piece by bringing in some sort of opposition, creating an incongruity, which runs counter to the expectations following from the discursive act echoed in the satirical piece (p. 96), for instance by combining presumably incompatible concepts. It is this incongruity that creates the humorous effect of satire, in accordance with a common notion of incongruity as a 'divergence from expectation' (Attardo 2014: 383 Satire as practice: uptake, (un)laughter, and the humour community. So far, I have been concerned with the structural features of satirical discursive acts and their social and affective-practical implications. To be 'successful', however, satire needs to be recognized and approved by its addressee. This 'uptake' of satire is far from straightforward (Simpson 2003: 153) , which brings me to the nature of satirical discursive practice.
According to Simpson, satirical practice involves a triangle of relationships between the satirist (producing the satire), the satiree (the receiver), and the target. The satirist usually disapproves of the target, and strives to make the satiree an ally in this disapprobation. For this to be successful, the satiree has to accept the satirical 'footing' offered by the satirist. If this fails, the bond between the satirist and the satiree may instead become weakened (Simpson 2003: 85-88) .
Importantly, rejection of the satirical footing is not necessarily a result of the satiree's cognitive failure to 'get the joke'. Simpson argues that satire works to suspend the validity claim of sincerity. But even if the satiree recognizes that the satirist is insincere, other validity claims may shape his/her response. While recognized insincerity also subverts any truth claim, it does not necessarily rule out a judgment of the satirical attempt based on claims to appropriateness. Thus, even if the satiree 'gets the joke', he/she may still reject the satirical attempt as inappropriate (Simpson 2003: 165-166) .
Here I assume that rejection of a satirical attempt may be communicated rhetorically through unlaughter (Billig 2005 Finally, for 'successful' uptake, satire must be in tune with the audience, understood as a 'humour community' characterized by 'likemindedness' and 'political affiliation' (Simpson 2003: 59) . Thus, following Weaver (2011) , an incongruity presented in humour must not '"threaten" the existence of the habitus' (p. 26) of a humour community, i.e., 'successful' humour confirms the audience's assumptions about social relationships. Otherwise, the utterance remains ambivalent, and anxiety and uncertainty follow (p. 34). This could partly explain rejections of satire as inappropriate even when the satirist's insincerity is recognized (see above).
Data and method
The present article focuses on discussions about EU-migrants begging for money in two responses to satire and other forms of humour as well as on these more or less subtle modes of humorous discourse in themselves, since it is assumed that whether emotional expression is spontaneous or restrained can only be determined by looking at unfolding affective-discursive practices (see (Un)restrained emotion, affective-discursive practice, and research on online racist humour). (Flyvbjerg 2006) , since, if Flashback racist discourse displays subtle and restrained characteristics, this seems orthogonal to the 'disinhibition' assumption, lending support to research emphasizing the subtle and restrained nature of online racist discourse, reviewed above. This also motivates the specific interest in satire here, since satirical discourse is an indirect means of communication.
Analytically, the present study focuses on subtle affective articulations in online racist discursive practice, as exemplified by satire and responses to it, and such articulations are contrasted with non-satirical narratives presented as humorous and with the responses to these narratives. In analysing satire, the procedure was to locate the central satirical elements following Simpson: the echoic prime and the dialectic incongruity intended to be humorous (Simpson 2003; see also above) . Like the analysis of all humorous discourse (Weaver 2011: 32) , this procedure required both contextualization in the case of the prime (what is the echoed discursive target of satire and how is it echoed?), and analysis of paradigmatic oppositions upon which central incongruities are built in the case of the dialectic. Contextualization also meant looking back on earlier discussions about migrant beggars on Flashback in order to locate paradigmatic oppositions circulating in this particular arena that make the satire appear incongruous without this being explicitly articulated.
Furthermore, contextual comparisons were made with non-satirical humorous narratives about encounters with EU-migrants in Flashback discourse.
Following Kleres (2010) , who builds on Frye (1990 Frye ( /1957 , these narratives were analysed as 'comic' narratives structured around a movement towards the protagonist's active achievement of 'triumph over […] obstructions' created by other characters in the story, thereby articulating a 'cheerful, joyous emotional universe […]' (Kleres 2011: 192) . However, in analysing this universe, attention was also paid to lexical and paraverbal markers presenting the narratives as humorous (e.g. Kleres 2011: 194-195) .
Regarding responses to both satirical and non-satirical humour, the analysis focused on articulations of amusement and non-amusement, both paraverbal and verbal. Instances of the former might include visual markers such as emoticons and avatars as well as onomatopoetic utterances like 'haha', while instances of the latter might include everything from utterances of the type 'Dead on target' to more sophisticated examples of mode adoption, where the satirical or other humorous practice is continued in a manner similar to the original satirical piece (Simpson 2003: 182) , indicating amusement. Furthermore, the analysis included meta-discursive markers in relation to satirical discourse, presenting particular utterances as intended to be read as funny or serious (see Billig 2001) .
In this connection, how was unlaughter analysed? Billig's definition of 'unlaughter' (quoted above; see also Billig 2005: 192) implies that the context in which laughter is absent is enough to determine whether unlaughter is practiced (i.e. is amusement expected in this context?). Apart from this, however, he suggests (p. 193) that unlaughter should also explicitly indicate recognition of non-serious intent. 5 Given this, the analysis looked for unlaughter in a strict sense, i.e. signs of non-amusement plus explicit reference to a recognized non-serious intent (e.g. 'That's really not funny'), as well as for other instances where amusement seems expected but is absent, the latter possibly indicating disapproval by rejecting the humorous discursive mode (see (1) Lately, many have migrated from the newer EU-countries to Sweden. These EU-migrants mostly seem to support themselves through begging in streets and squares. This has led many here in Sweden to express concern. Some complain that it is disturbing with beggars in the streets. While most readers will probably notice that there is something odd about (1) -for one thing, the proposal itself seems incongruous, which I will return to later -its satirical elements may be located following Simpson's (2003) To begin with, the post's form resembles a 'serious' mainstream opinion article in a newspaper. There is a seemingly balanced presentation of divergent opinions about a problem, then, a solution is proposed ('begging should be seen as just like any other job'), and finally, an argument is presented for this solution. This suggests that mainstream media discourse on the topic of EU-migrants is echoed. However, there are markers of ironic distance indicating that the post is a 'spoof' (Simpson 2003: 93) ; for example, the divergent opinions are listed in a trivializing way, suggesting that disagreements only concern whether street begging is 'disturbing' or whether the EUmigrants' 'poor housing' is found 'upsetting', which is hardly an exhausting description of mainstream media debate about the issue.
The spoof quality is strengthened in the satirist's subsequent posts in the thread. In one, the satirist writes that his/her proposal might seem like a 'joke […] but in Sweden it is not at all a joke', adding that he/she is 'greatly surprised that the Green- ). This brings me to the second element of satire, the dialectic incongruity, which introduces an opposition running counter to the expectations implied in the echoed discourse, whereby a comic effect is created (Simpson 2003: 96) .
Specifically, the centre/right-wing discourse on labour migration is echoed in the argument that street begging should be seen as 'just like any other job' because this would satisfy the 'need' for a 'well-developed begging industry' supposedly suffering from a 'great shortage in labour power' (see (1) above). In the context of Swedish labour migration discourse, this would be incongruous with expectations:
While this discourse defines immigration as positive to the extent that it provides Swedish industries with competitive advantages and professional skills, it would not define street begging as an 'industry' experiencing a 'shortage of labour power' with the necessary 'professional skills' in this sense. But in presenting street begging in this way, the satire juxtaposes the categories of begging and jobs in a way running counter to the expectations implied in the position taken by the centre/right-wing camp in mainstream discourse on labour migration. Thus, the more general establishment discourse echoed throughout the satirist's posts is mocked as leading to the supposedly absurd, and therefore comic, conclusion that street begging has to be defined as 'just like any other job'. This ascription of a putatively humorous incongruity to establishment discourse, constructed as positive towards migration, is a subtle attempt at communicating a racist position, dismissing all established views that see anything positive in migration.
Racist satire in the context of the Flashback humour community
However, this piece of satire is not presented to a mainstream audience, but to I will return to the responses evoked by the satire below. Here, the point is that what makes defining begging 'as just like any other job' an incongruous proposal, and therefore presumably humorous, in the Flashback humour community is that street begging is already constructed as the opposite of an honest job, especially when Roma people are suspected to be involved. This rests on a shared assumption of a sharp status difference between Roma EU-migrants begging for money and honest (presumably Swedish) workers, where the former are assumed to be inferior to the latter. What the mock proposal suggests by combining these supposedly incongruous elements, implying that begging and having a regular job are equally acceptable and legitimate means of support, is a levelling of this status difference. Such a levelling would be unacceptable and unexpected in the Flashback community, whose members obviously identify with the category of Swedish workers. Therefore, the proposal is expected to be humorous to this particular audience. So when establishment discourse on labour migration is mocked here, this is done by presenting it as really implying such a levelling of status differences between Roma EU-migrants and Swedish workers. Thus, following Billig (2005: 72-73) , incongruity is only held to be humorous when perceived to go against an assumed order of hierarchical social relationships, itself assumed not to be funny at all.
Furthermore, presenting a levelling of the assumed status difference between Roma EU-migrants and Swedish workers as a humorous incongruity to an audience identifying with the latter is a celebration of this status difference, articulating the triumphant joy in superiority described by Kemper (2011: 61) as the source of laughter. At the same time, this is contemptuous joy, since it ridicules a status ascription to Roma EU-migrants assumed to be undeserved, undeserved status being the source of contempt (Kemper 2011: 33) . Thus, racist contempt and joy in superiority are affectivediscursively accomplished in this satire, which, thus, targets Roma EU-migrants as much as establishment discourse on migration.
Bemused responses, unlaughter, and the making of a racist affective-discursive order
It may be recalled that to be 'successful', satire requires that the satirees, i.e. the audience, both recognize the satirist's insincere or ironic intent and judge the satirical act to be appropriate (Simpson 2003: 165-166) . In the interactions taking place around the satire under scrutiny here, these requirements seem to shape the responses of the other participants. Indeed, as the following will show, the satirical proposal analysed above does not receive many responses from the satirees that indicate amusement. This lack of amusement, however, is not due to a disagreement with the racist premises that the satire has to presuppose in order to have a humorous effect. Rather, as I will try to show, it is due to the 'inappropriateness' of the satirical proposal in the context of Flashback racist discourse.
There are some exceptions that do display humorous amusement in response to the satire. In (6), this is seen in the attempt to adopt the satirical mode, indicating conferral of insincerity to a piece of satire (Simpson 2003: 182) , which is nevertheless done in a much more direct and outspokenly anti-Roma racist manner in line with the stereotypical narratives presenting EU-migrants as dishonest (see ( However, a more typical response is to display disapproval of the mock proposal without any signs of amusement. Several of these responses purport to refute the proposal as if it was serious, as seen in quotes (7-9), denying that begging might be defined as a regular job or that it might contribute to the growth and development of the economy, which the satirist's ironic appropriation of centre/right-wing discourse on labour migration had suggested in (1): (7) No. Begging contributes nothing productively to society, neither principally nor factually, abstractly or concretely. Thus it is not a job. (Flashback 2014 , April 2, post #9) (8) Begging should not be seen as a job because it doesn't create any value or goods; socioeconomically it is purely negative keeping in mind all social misery, extra costs and added work for authorities and the social sector that it brings. (Flashback 2014, April 8, post #54) (9) It is NOT a way out to make begging into a legitimate occupation, then we are just solidifying a society where the streets crawl with beggars (Flashback 2014, April 3, post #22) While posts (7-9) emphasize the assumption about the categories begging and jobs as incongruous, they do not present this incongruity as humorous, as the satirist did, but rather as a serious proposal to be rejected, or even, as suggested by the expansive language (Retzinger 1995) in (9) This communicates insincerity and signals that amusement is expected. Thus, although the bemused responses quoted above may not be instances of unlaughter in the strict sense (see Data and method above), they may constitute a significant absence of amusement where it is otherwise expected. Possibly, they are instances of enacting 'seriousness' to communicate disapproval, i.e. mode rejection (Simpson 2003: 182) , rather than of a failure to 'get' the point, even though 'getting' the point is not signalled by explicit reference to the satire's non-serious intent.
However, several responses clearly indicate disapproval, while at the same time explicitly signalling that the ironic position of the satirist has been recognized, thus arguably articulating unlaughter in the strict sense (non-amusement plus explicit reference to non-serious intent; see Data and method above). In an earlier post, the satirist had claimed to be 'serious'; however, distancing him/herself from this position, he/she also wrote that the proposal would be 'dismissed as purely ridiculous' in a 'normal country', and claimed to be 'adaptable' to Sweden's 'multicultural agenda' (Flashback 2014 , April 2, post #6). Quote (12) is a response to that post:
(12) Hard to determine which ones are troll-threads... You wrote something about Sweden not being normal and that is worth commenting, because the goal ought not to be to throw in the towel and adapt oneself to a weird situation like you're suggesting but the opposite: to aim at changing it for the better again. Or what? (Flashback 2014, April 5, post #32) The reference to 'troll-threads' suggests that the proposal has not been taken seriously; it refers to posts that disturb the discussion through posting unserious comments. In fact, the word 'troll-thread', the lack of signs of amusement, and the uncertainty about Responding to this, the satirist again takes an ironic stance, both dismissing that his/her proposal is nonsense (Flashback 2014, May 6, post #61) believed, that it was out of the question to eat children. Your proposal -that begging is classified as work in Sweden -will not be generally dismissed (Flashback 2014, May 7, post #66) .
Post (15) presents the use of satire -and the satirist's positioning as both serious and unserious -when discussing EU-migrants begging for money on Flashback as risky in its ambiguous indirectness. Meiji does not disagree with the underlying racist assumption of the satire, i.e. that equalizing begging with work is a ridiculous and ultimately contemptible levelling of status differences between EU-migrants and Swedish workers. Rather, he/she articulates fear that readers might be lured into taking the satirical proposal seriously. Again, a demand for clarity of position is articulated: in racist Flashback discourse, humour is off limits if it is not clear about its racist message.
Thus, while racist humour may have the serious effect of contributing to racist order-building by reducing ambivalences surrounding the construction of the Other (Weaver 2011) , these final posts suggest that constructing a racist order also places constraints on 'appropriate' racist humour, which must unambiguously confirm the racist assumptions of the humour community. Perhaps, this explains the bemused responses to the satire (7-11) as well as the more immediate instances of unlaughter (12-15). To elaborate on this, I now turn to examples of more typical racist humour and responses to it in the material.
Superiority humour and laughter within the bounds of a racist order
As Billig (2001) argues, bigots do not lack a sense of humour, although racist humour is not innocent or inconsequential. My point in the previous section was to demonstrate that, at least in Flashback discourse, this racist humour is nevertheless constrained by certain boundaries of 'appropriateness', which demand that the communication of racist messages through humour is unambiguous. This is further suggested by typical examples of racist humour on Flashback, which might seem unrestrained but in fact might be said to conform to these boundaries. Examples of this sort of humour, and of the responses evoked by it, will be analysed below.
Sometimes, begging EU-migrants carry notes with them, accounting for their need for money. Several posts in the Flashback thread 'Immigrants who beg' include more or less elaborate ridiculing stories about these notes, which are typically presented as examples confirming the stereotypical narratives presenting EU-migrants as dishonest, discussed above. Quote (17) exemplifies such stories:
(16) Yeah, I've encountered those notes many times. Lately I have begun to snitch the note they lay beside me. The last time was yesterday (note no 3). I also take the note and put it in the inside pocket so that the beggar sees me do it.
When he was on his way back he looked at me 'i saw you take the note, can i have it back?', he said in shaky English. The guy was like 25-28 and a short buster.
'Nah, I'll keep it for now, hurry up so you dont miss your next train', I answered.
'What do you need the note for? Give it back!' 'I want it for my collection, deal with it.'
After that he backed off a few steps, started to punch the seats and swore wildly in gypsian 9 (romanian?), pointed his finger at me and banged on the window when walked by on the outside.
When he did so I pointed my finger back at him at the same time as I opened my jacket to show the note sticking up (Flashback 2012, May 10, post #134) Quote (16) follows the structure of comic narratives of triumph (Kleres 2011: 192) . The narrator presents an episode, in which he/she steals a note from an EU-migrant begging for money, who attempts to reclaim it. This is the obstruction in the narrative. Then, the narrator presents him/herself as resisting this attempt and as unaffected by concern for the EU-migrant, as seen in the utterances he/she attributes to him/herself. After another attempt at getting the note back, the EU-migrant is presented as giving up, displaying his frustration by hitting train seats, swearing, and pointing his finger. Then, the narrator presents him/herself as triumphantly pointing his/her finger back and showing off the note he/she has stolen. The post ends with a so-called 'evil grin' smiley. Thus, the narrator presents him/herself as successfully overpowering and humiliating an EUmigrant, signalling that this is a pleasurable event. This is an unambiguous example of the joy in superiority described by Kemper (2011: 61) .
This story evokes immediate responses such as the following: (17) 'Ha ha. 
Concluding remarks
The findings presented above support research that stresses online racism's increasingly subtle and restrained nature (see Research background). While online racist affectivediscursive articulations may often be explicit, as displayed in the triumphant narrative analysed in the previous section, they may also indirectly communicate contemptuous joy in superiority through the ironic modes of satirical discourse, as seen in the first analytical section. This suggests that online racist discourse does not always differ from offline, mainstream varieties. At least, satire as a mode of articulating racist superiority feelings in relation to EU-migrants by ascribing putatively humorous incongruities to an ironically echoed version of pro-migration mainstream discourse speaks against the notion of online racism as disinhibition.
However, although the satire examined above is based on stereotypical assumptions about Roma EU-migrants and constructions of a generalized 'establishment' shared by the Flashback humour community, it is typically not received by the satirees as humorous, but rather as a provoking proposal to be dismissed and a risky move that may be interpreted in the 'wrong' way, in other words, with unlaughter (Billig 2005) . Whether or not the satirees recognize the ironic intention of the satirist, this suggests that while satire may be used to articulate racism, the subtlety and indirectness of satirical discourse runs counter to the Flashback community's expectations of clarity about the racist message communicated. I argue that in displaying disapproval of this breach of expectations through unlaughter, attempting to bring the satirist back into line, the satirees build and maintain a racist affectivediscursive order around humour.
This, in turn, suggests that the affective-discursive practice of online racist humour is not only about releasing otherwise repressed pleasures of hatred by disrupting the boundaries of mainstream reason (cf. Billig 2001) , but also about raising alternative restraints demanding explicitness about those racist messages that are kept implicit in mainstream discourse. This runs counter to the notion of online racism as disinhibition, while it is more in line with social identity theory's emphasis on the power of in-group norms in shaping hostility, including hostile superiority humour, towards out-groups in online settings, although the present article also demonstrates how such in-group norms are accomplished in discursive practice.
This, I argue, is also shown in the approving responses to stories where EU-migrants are humiliated. For these stories, unambiguously articulating joy in superiority in relation to EU-migrants, confirm the Flashback humour community's expectations of clarity. Also, the responses, encouraging such stories and the actions portrayed in them, confirm that these expectations of clarity have been met, and celebrate this confirmation. Thus, while laughter at the humiliation of EU-migrants might seem unrestrained, it is but the other side of unlaughter evoked by ambiguous satirical articulations of racism; it is well within the bounds of the racist order accomplished through unlaughter and involved in accomplishing it. Racist order is not only built by the rhetorical structure of racist jokes (cf. Weaver 2011), but also by the receivers' conferral of 'humorousness' to those utterances that are accepted as meeting the Flashback expectations of non-ambiguity.
In light of this, one might ask why a participant in racist Flashback discourse chooses satire as a mode of communication. One reason might be that he/she attempts to communicate his/her racist message to a different, perhaps more mainstream audience, who might not be active participants, but who nevertheless, due to the accessibility of online forums, might read racist discussion threads on Flashback.
Communicating racist messages to such an audience requires more subtlety than expected by active Flashback participants. Given this, knowledge about racist satire hopefully contributes to the critical online literacy that Hughey and Daniels (2013) call for.
Finally, if online racist humour, satirical or not, is ordered rather than disinhibited, this supports theories highlighting the active cultivation of 'positive' emotions involved in hostility and violence against out-groups. Thus, the superiority humour targeting begging EU-migrants is perhaps not unrelated to, but involved in the processes leading to, the violent attacks against EU-migrants' tent camps in Sweden mentioned in the introduction. This, however, requires further investigation.
Notes
1 There are exceptions to the lack of attention to emotional processes in research on racist discourse, e.g.
Ahmed (2004).
2 It is common to divide humour theories into three traditions: superiority theories, incongruity theories, 2 It is common to divide humour theories into three traditions: superiority theories, incongruity theories, and relief theories (Weaver 2011; Billig 2005; Critchley 2002 ). While I discuss both incongruity theories and superiority theories, it is beyond the scope of the present article to compare all three traditions.
